Not Hopping on Every Bandwagon

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You can fool some of the people some of the time...

POLITICS-IRAN: Islamist, Socialist Revolutions Don't Mix
By Kimia Sanati

Credit:Max Strohmeier/Wikimedia


TEHRAN, Oct 3 (IPS) - An attempt to rope in the son and daughter of the Argentine revolutionary Ernesto Che Guevara to forge a parallel between Iran's Islamist revolution and the socialist revolution in Latin America through a four-day conference has ended in fiasco.

After Aleida Guevara protested from the podium against perceived distortions of her father's ideology by the first Iranian speaker, Haj Saeed Ghasemi, the four-day 'Che Like Chamran' conference, that started Sep. 25, was aborted and the Latin American guests whisked away.

'Che Like Chamran', the title of the conference, was chosen for the alliteration in the names of the two revolutionaries and because both Che and the Iranian, Mostafa Chamran, fought alongside revolutionaries in other countries. But the similarities end there, no matter what the organisers intended to promote.

Chamran, a United States-educated engineer and Islamist, helped Mousa Sadr found the Amal Movement in southern Lebanon and fought alongside Amal guerrillas in the late 1970s. Appointed the young Islamic Republic's defence minister by Ayatollah Khomeini, Chamran organised and led paramilitary forces during the early phase of the Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988) and was killed in battle in the Khuzistan province in 1981.

"We feel responsible towards all of humanity...unity is of especial importance to us. The reason for the relations established between our student group and the children of Che Guevara and the Latin American countries is what we have in common," Morteza Firoozabadi, secretary of the Pro-Justice Student Movement (PJSM), explained to the Islamic Students News Agency (ISNA).

"We are never afraid of death and that is what Americans are most scared of. They cannot accuse us simply by citing things like terrorism, seeking war or breaching human rights. We only aim to free the oppressed and to restore the rights of all the people of the world so we do not recognise borders and do not care what names Americans use for this," Firoozabadi was reported by ISNA as saying.

Organised by the student militia of Tehran University, the conference was attended mostly by counterparts from various other universities as well as members of hardline student groups such as the PJSM that strongly support President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's policies. These groups regularly organise demonstrations and protest rallies against the US and other western countries.

But Ghasemi, who is associated with Iran's Esteshhadiyoun (volunteers of suicide operations) must take credit for scuttling the conference. Referring to a translated version of a Che Guevara book that he held in his hand, he said Che Guevara was religious and believed in God. "The people of Cuba, Fidel (Casro) and Che Guevara were never socialists or communists. Fidel has several times admitted that he and Che and the people of Cuba hated the Soviets for all they had done.''

''Today communism has been thrown into the trash bin of history as it was predicted by Ayatollah Khomeini," Ghasemi told the conference and added that the only way to save the world was through the ''the religious, pro-justice movement''.

An indignant Aleida, however, started her own address "in the name of the people of Cuba". "We are a socialist nation," she asserted. She also said the people of Cuba were grateful to the Soviet Union and there had never been any discord between the two nations, as mentioned by Ghasemi. She advised him to "always refer to original sources instead of translations to find out about Che Guevara's beliefs".

"My father never talked about God. He never met God. My father knew there was no absolute truth,'' Aleida said, responding to Ghasemi's speech. The coverage of her address by state-sponsored news agencies like ISNA was brief and excluded most of her contradictory remarks.

At a meeting later with students of Amir Kabir University of Technology,where the leftist groups are particularly strong, Camilo Guevara told students he approved of all that his sister had said at the conference, ISNA reported.

The other main speaker, Mehdi Chamran, brother of Mostafa Chamran, avoided mention of Che Guevara or his ideology in his address. Chamran, who is chairman of the Tehran City Council is a loyal supporter of Ahmadinejad.

''President Ahmadinejad's promotion of closer ties with certain Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia called for some kind of identification of his brand of Islamist militant ideas with those of the leftists in Latin American countries,'' a leftist student activist from Amir Kabir University told IPS on the condition of anonymity.

"Ahmadinejad has visited several Latin American countries over the past two years. He has brought (Hugo) Chavez and (Daniel) Ortega here. Belief in socialism is considered a crime in the Islamic state, punishable by death. Ahmadinejad's slogans against the West and the U.S., his pro-justice rap, and his promises of economic assistance bring them here -- much to our disappointment," she said. "Daniel Ortega and other leftist leaders too must clarify their position about their relations with Iran. We feel greatly betrayed when for their countries' economic benefit they choose to support extreme rightists, fascists like Ahmadinejad," she added.

Following Aleida's outspoken address to the conference, the organisers took flak from their own comrades. "It is appreciable to commemorate Che Guevara as a revolutionary figure. Otherwise, our former perspectives on his ideas, methods and attitude are still the same. We are Muslims and he is non-Muslim. The difference will always remain," Mohammad Sedaghat, the leader of Student Militia of Shahed University was quoted by ISNA as saying.

"Chamran was a revolutionary Shiite Muslim whereas Che Guevara was totally atheistic. The only thing they had in common was their spirit of fighting injustice. For choosing friends we must meet other criteria, such as being God-loving -- besides being anti-American," Sedaghat was reported as saying.

Mohammad Jaffar Irani, a reformist student activist, was quoted by ISNA as pointing out that the same group that organised the conference had always considered Che Guevara an atheist. "If anyone other than the (hardline) group that organised this event had done so they would have gotten into a great deal of trouble,'' he was quoted saying.

"The organisers of the event were hardline supporters of Ahmadinejad who have nothing in common with leftists, even the Islamic leftists of the early days of the (Iranian) revolution. President Ahmadinejad has in fact much in common with President Bush, although he may sound very 'leftist'," an observer in Tehran told IPS on condition of anonymity.

"Leftist countries must realise that if the issues that make the Iranian hardliners confront the West such as its demand to be accepted to the nuclear club are resolved, today's leftist allies may instantly turn into their common enemies," he said.

"Unfortunately some wrong approaches (remarks) diverted the course of the conference from (discussing) commonalities to the differences (between the two revolutionaries). This caused the conference to be deviated from its main course,'' Sajjdad Saffar Harandi, leader of the Student Militia (Basij) in Tehran University, told the pro-Ahmadinjead website Raja News, explaining the fiasco.

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Nine Year Old Begs Canada's #1 Racist For Help

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Another fucking crime of capitalism.

It is completely understandable that a kid spoon-fed lies about "Canadian citizenship" and thrown into prison at the age of nine because his parents are of the wrong nationality might write to Stephen "Kill the Poor" Harper, hoping for some help. This kind of racist imprisonment - which countless families around the world are forced to suffer - must be most bewildering and incomprehensible and traumatic to the children.

What is less excusable is that we don't have a movement capable of inflicting serious damage on the powers that be, forcing them to be afraid of this kind of situation, afraid of how we will react.

Let's change that, shall we?

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Queers, Imperialism and Homophobia in Iran: Interesting Article from Gay City News

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Vienna Protest Against Execution of Queer Teens in Iran

The following is a very interesting and thoughtful argument about how queers in the US can best to act in solidarity with their “sexual minority” counterparts in Iran. While i may not be in the same groove as the authors, i also don’t disagree with any of what they’re saying. (It’s more one of those i-ain’t-a-‘human rights activist’ kinda things.)

Worth discussing and thinking about, as the issues playing out in this debate are the same issues playing out all over imperialism’s current conflict with the Islamic world, be it in Lebanon or Iraq or Afghanistan. So, without further ado, here it is:

PERSPECTIVE/ THE IRAN DEBATE

People-to-People Dialogue Key to Human Rights Progress

by Mitra Roshan and Kourosh Shemiani
Gay City News August 3-9 2006

The July 19 actions marking the anniversary of the execution of two young men in Mashad, Iran, have initiated an important discussion about the role Western LGBT activists can play in relation to persecuted minorities around the world.

We feel the July 19 actions were fundamentally flawed and showed a dangerous trend in LGBT politics, which could lead to a counterproductive, if not outright destructive, situation for sexual minorities in Iran and other countries. The problems are both in the misuse of facts and in a poorly developed strategy that is unlikely to achieve its purported goals.

First, the proof that the hangings were carried out because the two young men were lovers has not been verified by any credible organizations. Neither Human Rights Watch nor the International Gay And Lesbian Human Rights Commission could find conclusive evidence of the homophobic nature of the executions, or of a marked increase in homophobic policies by Iran’s new administration. The evidence offered was by a handful of gay activists, journalists, and bloggers who, in some cases, cited second or third-hand hidden conversations with anonymous sources inside Iran. It is disturbing to see some of the most respected veterans of LGBT politics be carried away by such reports.

Our suspicion of the cyber-writers is deepened by the language and attitude that they have adopted to talk about Iran. For example, Peter Tatchel, the head of OutRage!, proclaimed, “This is just the latest barbarity by the Islamo-fascists in Iran,” and he goes on to advocate economic sanctions and political isolation for Iran. And Doug Ireland has repeatedly used the word “pogrom” to refer to the situation of sexual minorities. This language is more in harmony with the “clash of civilizations” rhetoric adopted by the Bush administration than with human rights advocacy. It paints the violence of the Iranian regime as in a class of its own, barbaric and distinct from the presumably civilized violence of the war on Iraq, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo.

For this reason, the caveat of “no war with Iran” added to the bottom of the list of demands of the July 19 actions rang hollow and disingenuous. Intentionally or not, this rhetoric adds ammunition to the current U.S. administration’s stated goal of isolating and possibly attacking Iran, a policy that has nothing to do with protecting sexual minorities.

U.S. invasions have always required a liberal-sounding pill to make them digestible for the majority of Americans. In Somalia, Afghanistan, and the rest of the Middle East, that pill has been the condition of women, always quickly forgotten after the actions have gone forward. As recent events have made only more clear, in the Middle East, U.S. actions do not lead to greater security or freedom of any groups of people, least of all persecuted minorities.

So in the same vein, we are seeing Iranian sexual minorities, undeniable victims, held up and named as “gay” (regardless of how they identify themselves) and in need of our intervention. It is perhaps an indication of the times that established, respected veterans of American LGBT activism are following a path laid down by the neoconservatives’ failed attempts at imposed liberation.

This leads us to the second concern, the question of strategy. The actions on July 19 were not thoughtfully tailored to achieve their goal of getting Iran to “stop killing queers and kids.” In fact, the actions were counterproductive and potentially dangerous because their main tactic was to bring international attention to individuals and communities that survive, in part, because of their relative invisibility. Furthermore, if there is in fact no increase in persecution of sexual minorities in Iran, this action could well help instigate it.

In addition, Western activists need to be thoughtful about which Iranians they hold up as “representing” the interests of sexual minorities in Iran. While some groups have come forward with clearly admirable intentions, this very young movement needs time to develop its political analysis and strategies. The Western activists’ claim that they are following the lead of Iranian gays and lesbians is untrue and unacceptable as a justification.

The Persian Gay and Lesbian Organization (PGLO), which supported but did not initiate the July 19 actions, is following a road that is politically and strategically misconceived. We fear that the PGLO is in danger of placing itself outside of a strong and inspirational movement within Iran for democracy. Within this movement of intellectuals, trade unionists, and journalists, none has called for economic and political hostility as advocated by the gay activists with whom PGLO has become allied. In fact, the most prominent Iranian activists — from the Nobel Prize winner Shirin Ebadi to the journalist and former political prisoner Akbar Ganji — have specifically called for an opposite kind of politics that does not buy into the “clash of civilizations” rhetoric of racism and hysteria that the Western gay crusaders have fallen into. It is absolutely essential for the PGLO to also distance itself from such people and positions.

Much as in the U.S., the protection of sexual minorities is fundamentally a cultural issue that must be addressed through personal experiences and public debates that draw on values important to the entire community. Iranians are already engaged in these debates. Just one example is the situation of the transsexual people who are at the forefront of a cultural transformation in Iran, demanding greater respect and rights. The case for sexual minorities in Iran might first come through this movement and not from gay or lesbian-identified individuals. Change is already under way, and although it will be a slow, arduous road, it is unlikely to follow a Western pattern or be hastened by Western intervention.

Does this mean there is nothing impassioned LGBT activists in the U.S. can do to support sexual minorities in Iran? No, not at all. But it does mean that activists have to take a broad view of the issue of and be conscious of their own positioning. We have three recommendations for opening up the discussion:

1. Challenge official policies that limit people-to-people contacts between Iran and the West. The U.S. government has put severe limitations on the ability of American citizens and institutions to help and form relations with their Iranian counterparts. The Iranian government has taken similar steps, and in the process, the ignorance and mistrust are growing on both sides. With the emergence of independent organizations advocating for the rights of groups like women, transsexual people, prisoners, and disabled people, among others, the Iranian people have extended their hands, and we need to fight for our right to reach out to them.

1. Stop U.S. aggression toward Iran. If the shadow of U.S. military and economic pressure on the Iranian regime is lessened, the Iranian people will have increased breathing room to deal with their own regime and to resist it in a meaningful way. U.S grandstanding only plays into the hands of the Iranian hardliners, creating an external enemy around which they can rally support.

1. Most importantly, we must come to terms with the fact that we are limited in our ability to effect positive change in the rest of the world. This is the price we pay for living under the shadows of George Bush’s America and a history of Western domination, as our actions are always implicated in our nation’s global power. Therefore, it is first and foremost our responsibility to rein in our own government’s aggression and militarism and to be extremely careful in how we use our power as Westerners. This is a hard pill to swallow for many die-hard activists, but it is a fact that we have to face honestly and courageously. Only then will we be able to build responsible and productive grassroots politics in relation to the rest of the world.

Mitra Roshan and Kourosh Shemirani are founders of QIAm (Queer Iran Alliance). They are both Iranian-American activists and although they are using pseudonyms because they travel to Iran, they welcome all dialogue and contact at qiam2006@yahoo.com.

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Thinking About Iran

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Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? by Suroosh Irfani, Zed Books London 1983.

I’ve had Iran on my mind for the past few weeks. It’s beginning to bother me.

At first, it was because i was reading this book Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? by Suroosh Irfani. Next, it was because i was trying to write a little summary of the book for you all. And then, doing some more reading about Iran on the internet, checking out a couple of old pamphlets from the OIPFG (aka the Fedayeen, the Marxist-Leninist guerilla which fought the Shah and was then massacred by the Islamic right), doing some more reading on the internet, i realized there were entire dimensions just glossed over by Irfani. And so now, finally, it’s because i’ve been trying to write up a larger summary/review for you all. (See how devoted i am?)



Now the problem is that i don’t know a whole lot about Iran or Islam, and so it’s difficult to be sure that i’ve understood all the implications and inferences in what i’ve read. Not that i’d mind if this ignorance was just between my, myself and i… but there’s nothing like writing on the internet to make one aware of one’s standards.

After having spent too much time in front of my computer trying to summarize all of this, i kind of feel like my brain has been boiled in a pot of veggies for several hours – stewed and not very sharp.

So… a new approach. This is not a review or a summary of Irfani’s book, rather just me demanding closure by letting you know what i’ve found of interest, what i think of what i’ve read, and why i think it matters.

Please be forewarned: i write from a position of (relative) ignorance!

First Off: The Book
Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? was written by Suroosh Irfani and published by Zed Books in 1983. Just a few years had passed since the Islamic Revolution had kicked imperialism in the teeth, and even less time had passed since said same Revolution had kicked the Left in the teeth. (Or should i say massacred the Left, buried it, and pissed on its grave?)

Irfani’s is a fine book. I recommend it, but don’t leave your critical faculties at home. He was obviously close to the Islamic Left, and has nothing but good things to say about the Mujahedin, the progressive Moslem guerillas who helped to drive the Shah out of power. If you keep a sack of skepticism on hand as you read, and if you’re willing to read more in order to flesh out the picture, this is not a big problem.

The book deals with three related but separate subjects. The first is the history of Iran since the 1890s. Well actually, that’s not true: Irfani deals very specifically just with the history of rebellions against the monarchy – the Qusar dynasty and then the Pahlavi dynasty, both of which functioned as agents of imperialism (Russian and British, and then American).

Neither the Iranian people, nor the Iranian left, nor Islam, are presented as monolithic entities. There have been divisions based on ideology, on class, and also on plain old personal ambition and greed. Nevertheless, one could say that the monarchy consistently represented the interests of the imperialists, the clergy was overwhelmingly opposed to progressive reforms (i.e. equal rights for women and religious minorities, freedom of the press, etc.), the “Communists” were opportunistic and obsequiously tied to Soviet foreign policy, the “national bourgeoisie” (if that is how one wants to view people like Mosaddeq) was impotent. I’m painting with broad strokes here, but this is the impression Irfani gives.

The next strand of the book deals with progressive Islam, which emerges out of this unpromising situation, opposing both the “formalist clergy” and the imperialist modernizers. To be clear: this was not a watered down version of regular Islam, but was rather a militant and revolutionary kind of “liberation theology,” which (in theory at least) supported equal rights for women, national and religious minorities, freedom to organize, freedom of the press… all the while wrapping it up in a very militant anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist ideology.

A necessary personal admission: i have a kind of visceral attraction/fascination with religious revolutionaries. I concede that it may be a dead end, i acknowledge that they may even be “objectively reactionary”… but i also find the way in which struggle is conceptualized in terms of other-worldy absolutes and eternal truths to be attractive. Call it the sci-fi geek in me, blame the Roman Catholic school i went to as a kid, point the finger at Philip K. Dick… it’s just how i feel. (Not necessarily how i think!)

For this reason, i found the discussions of revolutionary Islamic thought, as elaborated most notably by Ali Shariati (radical left-wing Islam’s chief intellectual until he was murdered by the Shah’s secret police in 1977), to be very interesting. Discussion of the value of fighting for what’s right even if you know you’re going to lose, the way in which monotheism was interpreted as a rejection of earthly idols and authorities, the way in which revolution was conceived as an ongoing eternal struggle…

For instance: “Whenever and wherever a liberated person has refused to submit to despotism and its attempts for distorting supreme values, and has preferred death to a dehumanized, purposeless existence under a monstrous regime and inhuman social system, it is a response to Hosein’s call. Wherever there is struggle for liberation, Hosein is present on the battlefield.” (Ali Shariati, quoted on p.132) (Hosein was the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad)

Or else: “After every revolution, a group of opportunists stick themselves to the revolution. This causes the revolution to deviate from its path. However, this in itself is a factor in the evolution of the revolution, and the revolution becomes a continuous affair.” (Ayatollah Taleqani, quoted on p. 143)

i find a lot of this worthwhile, and i also find that it bears more than a passing similarity to some of the more appealing communist and anarchist ideas. You can come to similar conclusions without believing in God. (Shit, you can learn some of this just from watching a good spaghetti western…) So for me, the chapters about this Islamic liberation theology were well worth reading, though if you’re not interested in religious stuff it may be less interesting.

The final, climactic, section of Revolutionary Islam in Iran book deals with the Iranian Revolution. Irfani implies that it was largely through the guerilla attacks of the Mujahedin (which was based on Shariati’s ideas) and Marxist-Leninist OIPFG that the regime was pushed past the point of no return. He discusses the OIPFG briefly, and has nothing but nice things to say about them, but the book (and clearly his sympathies) is with the Mujahedin.

Attention is paid to how the brutal methods by which the Shah attempted to snuff out the guerillas. Both the Mujahedin and Fedayeen started small, and suffered incredible persecution and violence. Their family members were arrested and tortured before their eyes – even infants were abused in front of their parents. Women were gang-raped day after day, week after week, year after year, in the Shah’s interrogation dungeons. His secret police, SAVAK, earned such a reputation for their brutal interrogation techniques that they gave lessons to thugs from other imperialist outposts. They even invented their own tools, such as a gigantic human toaster which literally burnt the victim’s flesh off as they were questioned.

The regime reacted to popular demonstrations and protests with violence. A cycle was established, or so it seems, whereby protests would be met with bullets, and then this would lead to larger protests and greater repression… the situation continued to escalate, but in the people’s favour.

What was the relationship between “the people” – that amorphous mysterious mass – and then guerillas? Unfortunately, there’s not a lot of details given. I mean, “the people” are presented as being sympathetic to the guerillas and hostile to the regime, all the more so as word of the Shah’s brutal torture methods began to get out. But there is very little discussion of the mechanics of how (or if) the guerillas related to different sections of the population, and there is little discussion of revolutionary activity outside of the guerilla. Maybe that’s because there was none, but i find that hard to believe.

The Shah fled on February 5th, 1979, but the regime puttered on. The United States was eager to keep things under control, hoping to avoid a civil war. The army and secret police were loyal to the State, and were in the midst of negotiations with Khomeini about an “orderly transition” when suddenly Air Force cadets mutinied, using their weapons against the army. Within hours thousands of people had taken to the streets, and the Mujahedin and Fedayeen seized the moment, launching an all-out assault on the Shah’s army, completely destroying it within a matter of days.

So, to repeat the one of the most important factoids from this book: Khomeini did not make the Revolution, rather as the decisive insurrection broke out he was busy trying to negotiate with the imperialists.

Now, when describing what happened next, Irfani gives a play by play of how a small right-wing group – the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) – hijacked the Revolution. First off, Irfani seems to imply that Khomeini (who enjoyed great prestige amongst the masses, but had been living in exile for decades) might have gone to the left or to the right – “the IRP was created shortly after the monarchy was overthrown and had campaigned for projecting itself as the only Islamic group loyal to Khomeini and the Revolution.” (p.182) Irfani makes it sound as if the Ayatollah was up for grabs, or didn’t have his own intentions. Again, i know little about all of this, so it is possible – but i doubt it. Rather, this seems to be a way to avoid facing the fact that Khomeini had these fascistic proclivities beforehand, which would be awkward seeing as the Mujahedin (and OIPFG) had accepted (and praised) him for years as a symbol of the struggle against the Shah.

This point aside (remember, i told you to keep some skepticism on hand) Irfani gives an interesting account of how Khomeini and the Islamic right-wing basically allied themselves with those very same “formalist clergy” and even with remnants of the Shah’s regime, including the secret police. Reading the chapter “The Runaway Revolution” (just 16 pages long, but the best 16 pages in the book – someone should turn it into a pamphlet) one gets reminded of Orwell’s Animal Farm, or else what happened in the Soviet Union.

Irfani goes over the story, step by step, of how Khomeini and the IRP took over the State, eventually declaring war on the left. I must admit that it gets a bit confusing here, as the story collapses into what (at the time of publication) was the recent past, and so the details begin to overwhelm the narrative. But one gets the gist of it.

My criticism of how Irfani deals with these events is that he does so very much in a top-down manner, following organizations and leading political personalities but paying little attention to the broader population. After having read about “the people” demonstrating for the Fedayeen and Mujahedin, about how “the people” saw the guerillas as the true revolutionaries, one is left wondering where these “other people” came from, the ones who were suddenly forming gangs and street armies to attack the left. I mean, it wasn’t some aging theocrats out there swinging clubs over their heads, but masses (though maybe not the masses) of people.

This is not so dissimilar to his approach to the pre-revolutionary struggle, and it is unfortunate – although this is not a general history of Iran or even the Iranian revolution, but rather a focused account of left-wing Islam in Iran, i would guess that this could be discussed in terms of numbers beyond Ali Shariati, a few radical left-wing clerics and one guerilla organization. Or maybe not; again, i’m writing based on my hunches and guesses, not on any great knowledge…

Other Sources
As i mentioned above, i also made use of some other sources when trying to contextualize what Irfani was writing about.

I read a couple of old OIPFG pamphlets, but they were written in the early 70s, and can’t be blamed for not having crystal balls.

I did find a number of interesting Trotskyist analyses on the internet. Chris Harman –of Tony Cliff’s SWP/ISO tendency – wrote an essay The Prophet and the Proletariat; he does a nice job of fleshing out some details Irfani glossed over, about what “the Revolution” meant to the oppressed:

[I]n the months after the revolution Khomeini was no more able to impose a single authority over the revolutionary upheaval than anyone else. In the cities various local committees (Komitehs) exercised de facto power. The universities were in the hands of the left and the Mojahedin. In the factories shoras (factory councils) fought for control with management, often forcing out those associated with the Shah’s regime and taking over the organisation of production
themselves. In the regions inhabited by ethnic minorities – Kurdistan in the north west and Khuzistan in the Arab speaking south west – movements began to fight for self determination.

Or, to quote from an interview with former OIPFG member (and current anarchist) Payman Piedar:

every sector of the Iranian society was so thirsty for the so-called new founded "freedom" that they won through their own self-organization. Workers started the Shoura ("soviet" or "council") movement in many factories and even the peasants of the ethnic Turkaman minority (in the Northern region) organized themselves in the same fashion. Women held a major demonstration demanding the right to refuse wearing the religious attire (forceful covering of their body).
Students held lively debates and started organizing themselves into various leftwing groupings. The Kurds (the largest and most radical ethnic minority) immediately created their autonomous zone of control (either through the bourgeois Democratic Party of Kurdistan, or The Komole, a leftwing
petite-bourgeois organization with a strong pro-worker/peasant tendency), with their Armed Pishmarge (namely "self-sacrificing guerrilla") ready to shed their blood to defend their territory.

In other words, people trying to wrest some control over their own lives. Attempts at self-management. Popular anti-capitalism. Collective self-liberation. Good stuff!

But as Piedar explains, Khomeini and the IRP recuperated and neutralized this upsurge:

unfortunately none of the above mass organizations lasted more than a few months. The counter-revolution established their various reactionary armed organizations, namely the Pasdaran Enghelab (so-called "Guardian of the Revolution"), Basij (an armed youth formation), and worst of all The Hezbolaah Party (you could call them the fascist brigade, or "Falange"), and immediately started to smash, break up, and in the case of the Turkamans, carry out vicious executions. In Kurdistan a massive bombardment of their camps took away all the progressive gains that the masses had made for themselves. And, of course, the regime started to create its own "Islamic Shouras", "Islamic women associations" and "Islamic student associations" (which was the extension of the previous pro-Khomeni student organization that was already active prior to his return to Iran).

Harman presents some details about the social base behind this takeover:

What the group around Khomeini succeeded in doing was to unite behind it a wide section of the middle class – both the traditional petty bourgeoisie based in the bazaar and many of the first generation of the new middle class – in a struggle to control the hierarchies of power. The secret of its success was its ability to enable those who followed it at every level of society to combine religious enthusiasm with personal advance. Someone who had been an assistant manager in a foreign owned company could now run it under state control and feel he was fulfilling his religious duty to serve the community (umma); someone who had lived in deep poverty among the lumpen proletariat could now achieve both material security and a sense of self achievement by leading a hizbollah gang in its attempts to purify society of “indecency” and the “infidel Communists”.

The opportunities open to those who opted for the Khomeini line were enormous. The flight from the country of local and foreign managers and technicians during the early months of revolutionary upheaval had created 130,000 positions to be filled. The purging of “non-Islamic” managers, functionaries and army officers added enormously to the total.

Another Trotskyist group with some interesting things on their website is Workers Liberty, based in the UK (i know nothing else of this group, if anyone wants to fill me in). On their site they have this essay Islamism and the left in the Iranian revolution, by a member of Workers' Left Unity Iran and of the Organisation of Revolutionary Workers of Iran (again, i know nothing about these groups, though i am guessing they’re some kind of trots). While i don’t agree with him 100%, the author draws some excellent “lessons” from what happened in Iran. The most important (in my opinion) being that a regime can be anti-imperialist and reactionary at the same time:

The revolution threw out one of imperialism's most trusted allies, and gendarme, in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East. The counter-revolution that rode on the back of the revolution, even if its success was oiled by the scheming of Western governments, upset the carefully laid imperialist jigsaw in the region. The West, and in particular the USA lost a close ally. It took another decade and two wars to re-establish Pax Americana.

The Soviet bloc was openly ecstatic. The Iranian revolution had broken the chain of 'containing' states encircling the Soviet block at its most crucial link. The [Stalinist] Tudeh party, always a microphone for the Soviet Union's foreign ministry, had from the revolutionary days endorsed Khomeini. But the Tudeh Party had little support on the ground. It had to win the largest left organisation in Iran, the Organisation of People's Fadai' [OIPFG], if its policies were to be actualised. The Fadai', now a large nation-wide organisation, was suffering from theoretical paralysis. In the intellectual apparatus of the left 'reaction' and 'revolution' were opposites. To combine them was an absolute contradiction. The Fadai's deeply ingrained populism told it that a regime coming out of a popular revolution which had toppled the monarchical dictatorship, and was being opposed by every imperialist power, must be progressive. Its eyes, however, told it different.

Any lingering doubts were cast aside when the rulers of the Islamic Republic consummated their anti-imperialist rhetoric by the charade of the US embassy occupation. This and Iraq's invasion of Iran split the left right down the middle. The Tudeh Party used the authority of 'brother' parties to break the will of the Fadai'. The process was assisted by the fact that internationally the left in all its hues, all but a tiny faction, had hailed the Iranian revolution and counselled support for the counter-revolutionary regime that had defeated the revolution. The Fadai' split. A Majority fell into line behind Tudeh and Khomeini. The Minority became fodder for Khomeini's repressive machinery.

No Rose Coloured Glasses Please
As i mentioned above, Irfani is clearly sympathetic to the Mujahedin. His book provides a very useful overview of the group, its ideology, and how it related to the Revolution. However, there is another side to all of this.

The Mujahedin was insufficiently critical of Khomeini one might say, but that would be something of an understatement. The initial support that the Ayatollah enjoyed from the Left was what allowed him to consolidate his power.

For instance, Harman quotes Ervand Abrahamian’s book The Iranian Mojahedin:

[The Mujahedin s]crupulously adhered to a policy of avoiding confrontations with the clerical shadow government. In late February [1979] when the Fedayeen organised a demonstration of over 80,000 at Tehran university demanding land reform, the end of press censorship and the dissolution of the armed forces, the Mojahedin stayed away. And early in March, when Western educated women celebrated international women’s day by demonstrating against Khomeini’s decrees abrogating the Family Protection Law, enforcing the use of the veil in government offices, and pushing the “less impartial gender” from the judiciary, the Mojahedin warned that “imperialism was exploiting such divisive issues”. In late March when zealous club wielders attacked the offices of the anti-clerical paper Ayandegan, the Mojahedin said nothing. They opposed a boycott of the referendum over the Islamic republic and Kurdish struggle for autonomy. If the nation did not remain united behind Imam Khomeini, the Mojahedin emphasised, the imperialists would be tempted to repeat their 1953 performance [referring to the coup against Mosaddeq].

The importance of this passive support for Khomeini’s emerging regime is explained in Julius Leicht’s Who are the People's Mujahedin of Iran?:

Far from representing an alternative to their clerical opponents of today, they served them as a left-wing fig leaf— until the clerics felt strong enough to take action against the Mujahedin.

[…]

Following a secret meeting of Mujahedin leader Masud Rajavi with Khomeini in February 1979, the Mujahedin generally condemned any resistance to the clergy and its henchmen and thugs up until November of that year, justifying this by claiming that such resistance only played into the hands of imperialism. And they let their radical image be used by the clergy without raising any objection—something the mullahs urgently needed, since most of them had, at best, taken a cowardly, if not openly supportive stance towards the Shah.

Ayatollah Beheshti, for instance, the infamous supreme judge and close collaborator of Khomeini's, stated at this time: "The Islamic Revolution rested on three pillars: Imam Khomeini, Ali Shariati and the Mujahedin organization.” The media controlled by the clergy reported day in and day out on the heroic deeds and martyrs of the People's Mujahedin. Universities and high schools were named after them, governorships and other high-up government positions were given to their sympathizers. In return, the People's Mujahedin provided cover for "our Great Father Khomeini, the leader of the struggle against the monarchy", while Khomeini's people took over control of the army, the police, the judiciary, the state-run media and, not least of all, the extensive property of the Shah.

Although Khomeini's followers carried out the campaign for
a referendum on the constitution of the Islamic Republic in December 1979 and the presidential elections in January 1980 with the methods of terror and intimidation, the People's Mujahedin declared that they "would always support the progressive clergy and, in particular, His Highness, the Great Khomeini". They boycotted the referendum, but contested the presidential and subsequent parliamentary elections with their own candidates. Although the Hizbollah strong-arm squads attacked them with increasing brutality and Khomeini let loose tirades obviously aimed at the People's Mujahedin against "hypocrites" who "confused Islam with Marxism" and were "worse than infidels", the Mujahedin continued to refer to him as the "beloved father" who had "liberated Iran from the monarchy and US imperialism".

When the Mujahedin finally did break with Khomeini, and try and fight back, it was too late. In 1980 they staged a series of demonstrations, culminating in 500,000 people who marched against Khomeini on June 20th – but it was suppressed by the Khomeini’s new government – fifty people were killed, and the new regime survived as strong as ever.

It is also worth mentioning, although it is somewhat outside of the scope of “what went wrong in 1979”, that over the past 25 years the Mujahedin has formed a “National Resistance Council” and slid further to the right. Today, according to Leicht:

they echo imperialist propaganda against the existing Iranian regime—that it endangers Western interests through the construction of "weapons of mass destruction", the "exportation of fundamentalism and terrorism" and "opposition to the Israeli-Arab peace process". In the "platform of the National Resistance Council" (NRC) the following words are written: "The economic policy of the NRC is based on free market economy and the acknowledgement of national capitalism and the bazaar, private and personal property and investments .... The NRC considers the extension of relations to industrial nations to be essential for the reconstruction of the future Iran."

Again, not in a position to judge the honesty of any of these analyses, though i’ve found nothing that really contradicts any of them…

Revolution and Reaction and Women
Finally, i should point out that Revolutionary Islam in Iran: Popular Liberation or Religious Dictatorship? pays scarce attention to the role of “the woman question” within Iranian history, and the Islamic Revolution. When discussing clerical opposition to progressive reforms, Irfani does note that this was often because of their attachment to sexist social relations, but he doesn’t explain why.

This is unfortunate, but it’s so common it often passes unnoticed. Opposition to land reform, or relations with foreign powers, or new economic developments… these are all assumed to call for investigation, explanation, and analysis. But when it comes to keeping women in a subservient position, or increasing their exploitation, this is taken to be such an obvious and “natural” position that no explanation is necessary.

I am not saying that i have the answers to this– indeed, there are none to be found in Irfani’s book – but that doesn’t mean the question does not loom, whether spoken aloud or not: why is it on the question of women’s rights and freedoms that the “formalist clergy” repeatedly broke with the “progressive movements”. Today, why is the Islamic Republic mainly known for the restrictions it has placed no women, and the brutally violent way in which these restrictions are enforced?

Just to be clear, i don’t think that the answers to these questions would be the kind of cliché you get on CNN or Fox either. Women in Iran were actors too, not just passive victims. For instance, i was reading an interview with Mansureh Ettehadieh, a feminist academic in Tehran; she was asked about the Revolution’s effect on women, and she answered:

it was Imam Khomeini who specified that they didn't need their husbands permission to go to [Friday night] prayers. And another thing, you see, is that with this hedjab, we're supposed to live in a better society. We're supposed to be immune now, and protected. So those families who wouldn't permit their daughters to go to university now let them do their studies. Families are actually proud of their daughters going to university. This is important. I've always quoted Imam Khomeini as saying, 'the hedjab is your freedom'. And a lot of people would argue 'what kind of freedom is this? You know, you've got to wear that unbecoming veil' and so on. Many women who are emigrants would despise what I'm saying, but it's true. For a lot of girls, all this has meant freedom.

Do i buy this? Do i approve of uniforms as a way of claiming freedom? Of course not, but my point is that there are issues and dynamics here worth discussing. The State is an instrument of oppression, but so is the family, and at times your husband may be worst than the local government or religious official… so having the Ayatollah announce that (for the first time ever) you can go out to this important social event without your husband’s permission is not nothing. And i think it’s necessary to understand how so many men and women were won over to support Khomeini.

Lessons Learned
I have my reasons for being interested what went wrong in 1979, how the Revolution ended up so different from how most of the revolutionaries had expected. In fact, i think there are definite lessons to be learned, in terms of Third World struggles and religious liberation movements, but also in terms of the secular metropolitan left here in the First World.

But i’m not going to discuss these lessons today!

A teaser? Yes. You’ll just have to wait!

Categories: anti-imperialism, armed-struggle, book-review, fascism, iran, islam, liberation-theology, revolution

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