Frameworks

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Frameworks are sets of definitions, ideas about how things relate to each other, construed relationships, or even (especially!) of other frameworks, with which people make sense of phenomena and of themselves. Interlocking sets of frameworks which are cohesive enough can create and maintain a distinct identity, a kind of super-framework called an ideology, creating distinct ways of seeing and explaining things, which may not be easily translateable or compatible with analysis created through another ideological lens. It’s like people with different ideologies are watching different movies, even when they observe the same reality. But each of those ideologies or uber-frameworks are made up of more specific less all-encompassing frameworks which can often (with some work) be transposed from one ideological frame to another.

At all levels frameworks have multiple functions, however not of equal importance. They always constitute tools with which to either to clarify or obscure different aspects of reality, implicitly (sometimes explicitly) encouraging or discouraging certain forms of action or behaviour. At the same time, they always constitute a signifier of identity, a flag people can wave, indicating they are on the same side, or at least the wish or illusion that that were so. Or put another way, different frameworks make reality appear differently; both external reality (the observed) and internal reality (the observer).

As frameworks get in more explicit contradiction with other frameworks, more complex and all-encompassing, closer to the level of ideology, their identity-aspect grows. Which is not to say that their tool-aspect necessarily diminishes right away. But a trend is clearly visible. For instance, beyond the level of ideology – on the level of broad ideological families, frameworks collecting and connecting frameworks of frameworks, for instance “left” and “right” – at this level it does indeed seem like the identity-aspect is almost always far greater than the tool-aspect, which often seems reduced to nothing. Conversely, frameworks that are shared by “everyone” will appear “non-political”, and will often have no visible identity-function, other than separating “normal” people from crazies and imbeciles.

Frameworks can be free floating, integrated into different ideological structures, built upon in various ways. But not without consequence. Frameworks carry with them implications, once one is integrated into an overarching ideology, that can affect what else might or might not be integrated into that ideology, and how. Frameworks can be duplicated, integrated into multiple, even adversarial, ideological structures. When that happens, they can provide a backdoor channel, a wormhole of sorts, connecting these adversarial structures. Allowing other ideas to flow between them, often unobserved. Potentially allowing one to reach into the other, to take control of each other, to flip sides. The ability to do so is not normally symmetrical.

Frameworks can clarify things. The more robust a framework, the more things it can clarify or reveal. Even a shoddy framework is normally good at revealing or clarifying something. But beyond what a framework is good at revealing, there are always a set of phenomenon for which it is suboptimal, i.e. that it partially clarifies, but also distorts. These phenomenon would often be completely invisible without the framework in question, and so the framework improves matters somewhat despite its distortions. But unless a much better framework is found for them, they will often come to be understood primarily through the lens of the framework which is suboptimal for them. The scope of phenomenon observed increases, but the clarity and focus of the framework is diminished. This process can be ongoing, and the more powerful the framework in question, the more difficult it is to resist or reign in. Furthermore, as people think in frameworks, and as phenomena often repeat certain patterns or resemble other phenomenon occurring on different levels or in different ways, a powerful framework will often be adopted as a metaphor or a fill-in for understanding things for which it was not initially intended, but which it superficially seems to fit well. This is another factor by which frameworks can end up distorting or occluding more and more things. The end point of these processes is normally not attained, but when it is, the framework becomes an empty signifier.

In 1999, two Dutch anti-capitalists, Eric Krebbers and Merijn Schoenmaker, wrote about the way in which certain arguments adopted by the left, fit very well into the ideological structures of the right, and how this laid a theoretical basis for left-right crossover:

“In his analysis of the crisis of antiracism, Pierre-André Taguieff describes the appropriation of leftist discourses by the neoracists as retorsion (not in the sense of revenge, but in a slightly less common French meaning of the use of an argument against its author). This raises the question of when a leftist discourse is open to retorsion. Or the other way around: How would a discourse have to be structured so that it would not serve right-wing propaganda.” (“De Fabel van de illegaal quits Dutch anti-MAI campaign” http://ift.tt/1OD7djQ)

Krebbers and Schoenmaker hit upon an interesting, and important, question. How do frameworks, when adopted by both left and right, work to prepare the ground for “left” groups and individuals to find themselves on the right? Do all such shared frameworks enjoy this potential equally? What determines whether frameworks play more in favor of one ideological structure or another? Is it the assumptions or implications carried by the framework itself? Or does it depend on external factors – which side has the wind in its sails, so to speak?

Several years ago, i wrote about this in what was basically a note-to-self, Afterglow, which was spurred by conversations i had been having at the time. Some of the concrete observations i made there – about gender and race being undertheorized by insurrectionary anarchists for instance – i now think were premature and possibly off-base. However, the process i was trying to think about, about conclusions surviving the death of their arguments, about ideas losing their mooring, is not unrelated to what i’m thinking about here.

Another question: what is the relationship between frameworks and that consensus reality known as hegemony? Modern “democratic” capitalism seems unparalleled in its ability to coopt countercultural and even politically adversarial phenomenon. How do ideological structures, i.e. meta-frameworks, relate to hegemony? How do they become integrated therein? Is the process similar to that whereby shared frameworks created shared connections between mutually antagonistic ideological structures? Or is something different at work?

In any case, this is really just another not to self, neither conclusive nor even looking for conclusions, more just sketching out some rough ideas and definitions for possible future use.

 

on the main Kersplebedeb website: http://ift.tt/1OD7eUK

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Ideology and Practices (publicautonomy.org)

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Some examples? Let’s start with something — an opinion or claim — that is not ideology, even though it might seem to be. Here’s one: “Canada is a democratic society that treats its citizens fairly.”

It may be bullshit, but it’s not ideology. The ideology is this: that one barely notices the fact that there are “borders” instituted around “nation states,” and that one of these is “Canada”; that this “Canada” is “a society,” in the singular, rather than multiple societies, or multiple systems and structures some of which cross borders, etc.; that “countries” can be labelled “democratic,” rather than institutions or practices or specific decisions, so that the question of whether it is or isn’t democratic is a sort of total judgment, appealing to some unspoken but supposedly obvious criterion; that many of the people in the supposed “country” are “citizens,” while some are “non-citizens”; that the standard for treating “citizens” “fairly” will differ from the standard for treating “non-citizens” fairly. And so on. Ideology lies here, in this stew of unexamined obviousness. None of it is stated in the claim under consideration (“Canada is a democratic society that treats its citizens fairly”). But all of it is presupposed by that claim.

source: http://ift.tt/1T1SSPa

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finding our way out

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So we’re somewhere, can’t even agree on how to characterize where, but what we do agree on is we want to get out. There’s paths leading in all directions, and we can only see so far down each. Some we know are dead ends, some we know are worse. But even there, where a passageway once taken seemed to discredit itself forever with bloodshed and tragedy, we can’t really be sure it wasn’t the right one, and the we didn’t just miss a side door or tunnel branching off X feet in. It may be unlikely, and unreasonable to count upon, but no one can rule it out as a possibility.

Welcome to the epistemology of the maze. Welcome to life in the 21st century.

Situated as we are — where? still can’t agree to say! — we know we better move. So we will. And sometimes we’ll go down a passageway hoping it is the way out. Sometimes we’ll go with no hope in our hearts, just to rule it out, or to confirm a suspicion of another dead end.

Deductive? Inductive? Never mind, just put one foot in front of the other, and let’s go.

on the main Kersplebedeb website: http://ift.tt/1sp9W2s

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Afterglow

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What happens when the foundations are cut out from under an observation? When a solid thought gets emptied out, vacated, left as hollow as a drum? When we're talking ideas, what does a giant with feet of clay look like? An emperor with no clothes? Could what seems that way really be a chrysalis, an intermediary stage in which an idea jettisons that which was old and truly comes into its own?

What i've been thinking about is a subsection of all those things that we "know", but we don't know why we "know" them. The countless cases where, as a former Attorney General once apologized, we don't know how to define something, but we "know it when we see it".

i'd suggest that this feeling can indicate one of two things, each one a consequence of transition. On the one hand, perhaps it's a sign of a thought or observation in the process of forming, coming into being - something that can be intuitively seized as a logical conclusion, even though we haven't done all the math yet. An obvious way forward, a part of building.

That's not what i've been thinking of, though.

What i've been thinking of is those cases when a belief still feels self-evident, but the intellectual road that got us there has been obscured or lost. So we're left with the observation - we may even cling to it - but we can no longer explain why it's so. While it still feels important, its presuppositions seem obsolete.

Former conclusions float free, untethered from the ideas and movements and context that they were tied to. Perhaps they will be integrated into new movements or grand theories, perhaps they'll find other freefloaters and together form a foundation for something new, or else... do they disappear? or do they just wait to be rediscovered? i'm not sure...

In any case, this orphaning process, this process of conclusions surviving the death of their arguments, is what i mean by "afterglow". Like the embers of a fire that's gone out, or the afterimage you get after you stare at the sun, or the feeling one might get in the last moments of a drug trip.

i've been thinking this way in relation to the transition away from the 20th century left, our present time of post-whatever, and specifically the way in which some of the political insights from the previous movements have survived their parents' demise. Am wondering where they'll end up.

For instance, a lot of anti-sexist and anti-racist "common sense" was actually the result of hard ideological and political battles within and between different groups of people. Queer and trans realities exist not just because of struggles by the "progressive movement" but also because of struggles within and if need be against said "progressives". (These are the broad outlines, if anyone wants examples there's a litany of anecdotes and horror-stories preserved for the anti-nostalgic who want to feel good about how far we've come, or who want to fuel the drive to distance themselves from their own movement's past.)

The movements and thought-structures that produced this "common sense" and these new realities no longer exist. Or if they do exist, they might as well be unrecognizable. Subjectively, we feel like we're in a time between cycles of struggle, a low tide, or an interregnum, as one of my pals is fond of saying.

If one were to explain ideas that way, i guess what i'm talking about could be translated as "ideas losing their material basis" - all i'll stand by, though, is that they've lost their mooring.

So what will happen to these ideas? Will they be reintegrated into the left? If not, have they been internalized sufficiently to be retained? As part of the left or as part of society in general? Or will they slowly fade away?

The context in which i have been asking myself this is the relationship between insurrectionary anarchism and the insights that get put under the "anti-oppression" umbrella.

On the level of theory, i understand insurrectionary anarchism to be hostile to identities, and to be hostile to the 20th century left and to the various social movements that existed in its orbit. Insurrectionary anarchism seems therefore to be hostile to the movements and schools of thought that produced most of the insights about racism and sexism, and which helped to create the space in which queer and trans liberation could sprout. (i'm not talking about "identity politics", but i'm talking about the presupposition that we're not an unvariegated mass, but that we individually and collectively have specific experiences which give us more in common with some people than with others.)

At the same time, many of those who seem broadly within the insurrectionary anarchist orbit are obviously very serious about opposing racism, sexism, gender oppression and homophobia. Their intellectual lineage may have been hostile to these insights and breakthroughs, but these certainly constitute their reference-points now nevertheless.

But insurrectionary anarchists seem to be uncomfortable theorizing about this. And when they do, they're not really that radical, or new, or even interesting. And so i wonder to what degree their opposition - real and fierce as it is, today - is a consequence of afterglow - right now the insights of yesterday's left may still seem "obvious" and like "common sense" even to those who reject their lineage, but how will they look in the future? As optional? As having been superceded? It's open to question.

i would argue that within the broader radical left, this process is further advanced in regards to opposition to antisemitism. Once an almost axiomatic aspect of being on the left, opposition to antisemitism remains widespread but undertheorized, and in some quarters you get the sense that it is being looked at like the guest nobody can remember inviting to the party. Nobody wants make a fuss (apart from those who enjoy drama for its own sake), but there are signs that its place at the table is coming up for grabs.

i'm not talking about a process that only effects those who are comfortable with these developments. Whether one is for or against it, happy or sad about it, the way antisemitism is presently undertheorized is evident both is the superficial arguments of those of us who can simply repeat that it is "bad" and also in the dishonest arguments of those who say they're against it but that the real problem is talking about it.

to think about...

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Genealogy vs. Context

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This is more a note for future reference than a thought-out argument, so bear with me (or skip, if you prefer).

When we think about things, they have two aspects which we need to grasp. i'll call these genealogy and context.

Genealogy is where things get their identity from. I.e. the genealogy of an organization would trace it back to its origins, including name changes and changes in policy and form. Then if at its origin it had been a split from a previous organization, genealogy would trace that organization back to its origins, or if it had come out of a particular movement or campaign, then genealogy would trace that, further and further back, as far as you can or are inclined to go.

Genealogy is fun, in a geeky stamp-collector kind of way, but for the overenthusiastic it can also be very misleading. It is easy to exaggerate the importance of the scandalous, i.e. that the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith used to be the Holy Inquisition, or that Levesque's PQ came out of Bourgault's RIN which at its origins included many young nationalists from Barbeau's fascist Alliance Laurentienne. Scandalous, but not incredible enlightening as to what's going on here and now, because a break can often see more left behind than carried on.

It is difficult to appreciate the relationship of a thing to its own history, which can at times be direct and important, and at other times can be nonexistent, at least for practical purposes. Those are the limits of genealogy.

The second way that things exist is context. Not just the mundane fact that everything has a context, but that things often fit into patterns that are only visible when viewing other things at the same time - often things that have no direct relationship to one another, and so which are arbitrarily selected after the fact simply based on the pattern they constitute. Things retain their identity, inherited through their genealogy, but they are also a part of a broader reality which determines much of their nature. For instance, when looking at the waves of history - for instance the postwar wave of decolonization, or the related 67-68 wave of student and youth rebellion, or the late 80s-early 90s wave of neocolonial peacemaking - clearly the players had their own genealogies and identities, but around the world something else was going on which pushed matters, and pushed the players, in particular directions. (This begs for a resuscitation of the old problem of universals...)

To give two examples: that the FLQ came into existence in the early sixties has something to do with the history of Quebec nationalism (genealogy), but very little compared to "the times", the overarching wave of anticolonial struggles (context). Similarly, that the Maoist movement in Quebec came into existence in the early 70s and fell apart in the early 80s certainly has something to do with the genealogy of communism and the left in Quebec, but a richer understanding may be reached if one also considers the rise and fall of first world Maoism in myriad countries at almost the exact same points in time.

These are obvious examples, but not all cases are so clearcut. Is the antideutsche movement the result of genealogy (a reaction against the weakness around antisemitism of the West German 70s/80s far left) or the result of context (the rise of reactionary ideology around the world in general - and racism in Germany in particular - in the 1990s?) - i'd guess the former, but it's just a guess. (& when considering specific organizations it becomes even more difficult to measure.)

Or let's take a famous case, the rise of Nazism in Germany, which has been studied at length in terms of the history of Germany, the history of antisemitism, the history of authoritarian right-wing schools of thought, and other competing geneaologies - it can also be (and has also been) studied in terms of its context, similar "shirt movements" and other fellow travelers emerging around the world at the same time, sexist and racist consciousness mutating through the traumas of World War I, the Russian Revolution and the Great Depression, anti-Marxist "socialisms" that emphasized the primacy of the nation and cross-class-unity flourishing even on the left.

The relationship reminds me that Mao had something to say about the relationship between internal factors and external factors. He took the counterintuitive view that internal relations are normally more important than external relations, that "what's out there" is of less importance than "what's inside", because it's through the strengths and weaknesses of the internal that the extrernal will be mediated. There's a lot to be revealed if you think this way, though like most things if you take it too far it can get pretty silly, i.e. if someone drowns in a lake it's not because of the water (external!) but because they're not a good swimmer (internal!) or maybe simply because they have lungs not gills (really internal!).

But i think Mao's ideas are a truly red herring in this case, as genealogy is more like history than internal reality - and what i mean by history here is that which is subjectively experienced as "internal" but in actual fact remains external to us, mediated by a bunch of factors ranging from what has been suppressed/preserved to how that is interpreted to how much is "remembered" (though in the case of social formations that is the wrong word, as the individuals within such formations do not necessarily have personal memories of much of the "history", as they were likely not even there or perhaps had not even been members or active or alive when events in question occurred).

Maybe the metaphor from physics of light being both a particle and a wave makes more sense. (At least, not having any training in physics, my ignorance allows it to seem apt.)

In any case, all i really want to say, is that when thinking about things - big things small things, important things trivial things, common things esoteric things - it's worth keeping in mind both genealogy and context.

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Literate Frequencies

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i was chatting with an anarchist comrade at the recent bookfair in New York City, when he turned to my table and spotted one of my more in-your-face Marxist-Leninist books, a history of relations between white and Black revolutionary organizations in the united states, specifically of the mutually parasitic dynamics that can occur when people get lost in the forest of (false) nationalism/internationalism.

This comrade laughed when he spotted the book, shaking his head. "I love that book," he said. "Though you know I disagree with every single thing in it."

& i understood exactly what he meant, and didn't thing this was a silly statement.

While perhaps not as strongly, i have found myself feeling the same way about various books over the years, so i enjoyed the forthright manner in which the statement was made. It got me thinking: how can one love a book, while disagreeing with its arguments?

Books present arguments in a layered fashion. Normally the argument is couched in the form of a story, depending for its integrity on a number of facts spun together by the authors' words. There are honest and dishonest ways of weaving this web, and instructive and destructive ways of leading our minds to follow an argument.

Rather than thinking of this using the metaphor of layers - which in the material world we normally encounter one at a time - i think books actually reveal themselves to us more like sound, or perhaps music. Different instruments play at the same time in music, just as these different aspects of an author's message present themselves at the same time in a book.

Many of my favourite books became my favourites not because of the arguments made - which i often couldn't judge right away - but rather because of the author's implicit suppositions. It's as if behind the loudest noise there's another frequency, maybe one you can only pick up on slowly, more a method than a subtext, a way in which facts are chosen and related to each other.

An author shares not only what they think they see, but also how they see. You can end up disagreeing with the argument while learning a lot from the method, just as even a correct argument can be perverted by a dishonest method.

Authors tend to use the same method in their different works, which is probably why you can know you like or dislike a particular author without reading every one of their books. Method is more specific than genre (though i suppose the latter may form a grouping of a variety of related methods).

There is a point to this, that texts have these multiple aspects, that they communicate with us on multiple frequencies (to stay with the metaphor of sound) and that as such what we learn from them is... complex. Politically, i would say that normally the method by which an argument is presented is more important than the actual argument itself.

There is a disagreement i have had, again and again, over the years regarding what is and is not sectarian in terms of the literature i promote. i certainly won't promote just anything on the left, but there is no clear ideological guide to what arguments i will or will not be into. Two authors can make the same claim, and one will strike me as worth reading and the other one not. Multiple authors can make competing and disagreeing claims - take a look at the various leftist and anarchist newspapers for instance - and yet underlying these opposing views is often a unity of method - and more often that not, not a very good method at that!

So to identify a few aspects of method that i find useful, and that can occur (or be negated) in any kind (M-L or circle-A or left communist) of texts:

• that the oppressed (not their vanguards or organizations or liberators, though these may exist no sarcasm intended) are themselves central to the story - indeed, the oppressed are the story;
• that things look different with time, so to grasp what's really going on we need to unearth the commonalities while not descending into nowism;
• reality is not teleological, i.e. it does not unwind like a didactic morality play - there may be "good guys" and "bad guys" in retrospect, but you can't assign these roles a priori;
• that nothing and no one is perfect;
• better to tell the truth than to lie.

Telling a story is in and of itself an act for which we must take responsibility; our storytelling, our development of analysis, can be corrupt or it can be honest. The method in which a text is built can be authoritarian or antiauthoritarian - far more so than the argument which emerges from the same text.

Developing an antiauthoritarian method of telling our stories is a necessary part of developing a revolutionary praxis.

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Prison Round Trip by Klaus Viehmann

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Prison Round Trip $2.95 from left-wing books dot net (normally $4.95) Saddle-stitched pamphlet 31 pages Published by PM Press and Kersplebedeb in 2009 ISBN ISBN 978-1-60486-082-5

“Prison Round Trip” was first published in German in 2003 as “Einmal Knast und zurück.” The essay’s author, Klaus Viehmann, had been released from prison ten years earlier, after completing a 15-year sentence for his involvement in urban guerilla activities in Germany in the 1970s. The essay was subsequently reprinted in various forums. It is a reflection on prison life and on how to keep one’s sanity and political integrity within the hostile and oppressive prison environment; “survival strategies” are its central theme.

“Einmal Knast und zurück” soon found an audience extending beyond Germany’s borders. Thanks to translations by comrades and radical distribution networks, it has since been eagerly discussed amongst political prisoners from Spain to Greece. Now, thanks to the efforts of Gabriel Kuhn, it is finally available to a wider English-speaking audience.

Now i have to say, i like most of the texts i publish. Makes sense, right? But then there are texts one really likes, what i think of as "goosebump reading", because they really are that good.

That's how i feel about "Prison Round Trip". This is a highly accessible text about surviving prison, not in terms of simple physical survival, but in terms of one's psyche and political identity. As Klaus explains:

In prison, the necessity of survival strategies is immediate; without them you are at the mercy of the enemy. Prison is a hostile environment, and it has been designed as such by people who see you as their foe. Have no illusions about that. In regular prisons—especially old-fashioned ones—conditions are often atrocious and sometimes violent, but there are at least social structures. In isolation or maximum security units, social relations are controlled, regulated, abolished. Isolation means the absence of social life and the presence of yourself. You have nothing but yourself, and you have to find ways to deal with it. This is possible, but it is not possible to know beforehand who will get through prison okay and who won’t. For someone with little life experience, limited political self-motivation and uncertain (possibly egotistical) future plans, it will be difficult. A colorful biography in which prison does not mark the first rough period, optimism even in the face of a dire situation and the ability not to take yourself too seriously all help.

Nor is this a text only directed at those who imagine that they may one day be locked up. Again, as Klaus explains:

What is the point of talking about survival strategies today—years later? Is it worth trying to organize and sum up your experiences? It is, at any rate, difficult to bring them into words and sentences. Yet, for those who will spend time behind bars in the future, they might be useful. Besides, since the experiences of (political) prisoners are neither extra-societal nor a-historical, their survival strategies might also help those comrades who experience their everyday life as little more than a somewhat coordinated form of “getting by.” To focus on what’s essential, to plan your everyday life consciously, to use your energies in meaningful ways—these are all qualities that are useful.

Klaus Viehmann was a member of the anarchist 2nd of June Movement in the 1970s. While he was in prison the 2JM announced that it was merging with the Red Army Faction, and Viehmann was one of a number of 2JM prisoners who publicly criticized this decision.

Prison Round Trip includes a beautiful preface by Bill Dunne, who has himself been a political prisoner, held by the u.s. government for over thirty years.

A "must read."

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Thinking & Forgetting

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Y'know...

thoughts without discipline
are
a lot like leaves
waiting
for the wind to come

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Thinking About Thinking: The Limitations of Internal Consistency

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i've been thinking about thinking, and this is some of what i thought...

we go around with these worldviews which consist of various working hypotheses, often largely unspoken, but which we nevertheless depend on to make sense of our world.

we are always refining our working hypotheses, trying to make them fit with each other, with the evidence at hand, and with our ongoing experiences. (not a little bit, we also refine them so that our choices and experiences can fit with them, that is to say so that our various compromises and foibles can be rationalized, but that's another subject really)

the thing is, that for most activists, intellectuals, and geeks, the weight is often on making our thoughts or ideas fit with each other, and once a working hypothesis is internally consistent, it is normally not too difficult to find a way to fit any external evidence into it by tricks of interpretation. when a working hypothesis is this consistent, so that it holds itself together and is able to integrate subsequent experiences, it's durable enough to emerge as a "line" and as different people come to roughly similar points in this process, as a "school of thought", be it anarchism, maoism, trotskyism, feminism, primitivism, or whatever.

now the trick is that even if you're operating on good faith with an open mind, the problems we're dealing with are really so big and complex that once a set of working hypotheses has evolved into something as durable as a school of thought, it's going to take a lot countervailing experience and evidence before it can change. That is to say, even a fundamentally untenable worldview may take a long time to prove itself untenable; until then, it seems to be able to "handle" and make sense of the world. So it takes perhaps months, but for most of us years or even decades, before all of these working hypotheses may prove themselves to not really be internally consistent, at which point (assuming we are still operating on good faith and with an open mind) we may be forced to abandon the -ism we held for so long.

all of which is to say, just because a theory or worldview "makes sense" and explains things on its own terms, is no guarantee that is it actually true or really is going to make sense of everything thrown at it.

the beauty of certain situations, including but not limited to "revolutionary crises", is that they throw up so much experience so quickly, that they reveal so much which is normally hidden, and provide so many opportunities to test what have only been theories, that they can overload people's preconceptions and force them to re-evaluate their worldviews. When this happens in a tame way, activists speak of "teaching moments" when they can forcefully advance their views, and show people the value of their ideology. But when these situations occur in an intense and wild manner, they become teaching moments for the activists themselves, forcing us to clarify, improve or abandon preconceptions as we are confronted with the choice of defending or attacking new visions of how things relate and where we can go from here.

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